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RECENT CASES
CORRECTIONS LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRELIMINARY
PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS IN NEW YORK STATE To BE DETER-
MINED BY THE PAROLE BOARD ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.
Appellants Calloway, Robinson and Richardson and Respondent
Stephens were parolees charged with violating the conditions estab-
lished for their parole. Appellants Calloway and Robinson brought'a
habeas corpus proceeding to obtain their release from custody follow-
ing arrest and detention. The trial court ordered that the parole
board conduct a preliminary hearing, subject to certain rules,1 to de-
termine whether there was probable cause to believe appellants had
violated their conditions of parole. Both Calloway and Robinson
requested the aid of counsel at the preliminary hearings, but their
requests were denied. In both cases the parole officer, by written deci-
sion, found probable cause that these parolees had violated parole.
Each was detained without bail pending a final revocation hearing.
Both habeas corpus petitions were dismissed by the trial court,2 and
the dismissals were affirmed by the appellate division.3
Appellant Richardson initiated a proceeding under New York
C.P.L.R. Article 784 seeking a judgment granting him an immediate
preliminary inquiry at which he would have the assistance of coun-
sel, receive a copy of the charges against him, and have an opportunity
to contest these charges to determine whether there were reasonable
grounds to believe he had violated the conditions of parole. Ulti-
mately, he sought a decision rescinding the determination which had,
without such inquiry, declared him a delinquent parolee. The trial
court granted his requests, 5 but the appellate division reversed. 6
1. Included among these rules were the requirements that: (1) the hearing officer
make a written report including a summary of the evidence presented at the hearing, a
statement of the evidence relied on, and the reasons for whatever determination was
made and (2) notice be given to petitioners and their attorneys of the date, time, place,
and purpose of the preliminary hearing. People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 71 Misc. 2d
810, 811, 337 N.Y.S.2d 37, 39 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
2. Id.
3. People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 41 App. Div. 2d 106, 341 N.Y.S.2d 775
(4th Dep't 1973).
4. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963).
5. In re Richardson v. Board of Parole, 71 Misc. 2d 36, 335 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup.
Ct. 1972).
6. In re Richardson v. Board of Parole, 41 App. Div. 2d 179, 341 N.Y.S.2d 825
(Ist Dep't 1973).
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The facts in the case of respondent Stephens were substantially
similar; however the appellate division reached a contrary result.
In this case the appellate division unanimously affirmed 7 the trial
court's judgment in a proceeding under Article 788 granting a peti-
tion for a judgment directing the New York State Division of Parole
to hold a preliminary hearing to determine whether there were reason-
able grounds to believe petitioner had violated his parole, and direct-
ing a hearing to be held. At this hearing, Stephens was afforded the
assistance of counsel.
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the four cases
were consolidated. In a divided opinion, with three judges dissenting,
the court held: No absolute right to counsel exists under either the
New York State or United States constitution for a parolee at a pre-
liminary parole revocation hearing, but the right to assistance of
counsel at such hearing should be determined on a case-by-case basis
according to federal constitutional guidelines;9 there is no right to
bail or to release for a parolee pending a parole revocation hearing.10
People ex rel. Galloway v. Skinner, 33 N.Y.2d 23, 300 N.E.2d 716,
347 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1973) ."1
7. Stephens v. Hirsch, 41 App. Div. 2d 703, 340 N.Y.S.2d 615 (2d Dep't 1973)
(mem.).
8. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963).
9. These guidelines were set out by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1764 (1973).
10. In addition to the constitutional holdings, the court ruled on two subsidiary
questions. The first was raised by appellants Galloway, Robinson and Richardson. They
argued that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), which grants to all parolees a
right to a preliminary revocation hearing, was fully applicable to all parolees whose
revocation was pending on June 29, 1972, the date Morrissey was decided. The court
held that "if on the date of the Morrissey decision, the charges of delinquency had not
yet been considered and the parolee had not yet been declared delinquent by a member
of the parole board, then he should be entitled to a Morrissey preliminary hearing for
the revocation process had not yet been engaged." People ex rel. Galloway v. Skinner,
33 N.Y.2d 23, 33, 300 N.E.2d 716, 720, 347 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183 (1973). See also
People ex rel. Maggio v. Casscles, 28 N.Y.2d 415, 271 N.E.2d 517, 322 N.Y.S.2d 668(1971) for the state of the law regarding retroactivity for hearings under People ex rel.
Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 367, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
The second subsidiary issue was raised by petitioner Richardson. He contended that
Morrissey required that preliminary hearings for alleged violators who were arrested in
New York City and whose alleged violations occurred there be conducted within New
York City, in order to facilitate production of witnesses and other evidence. His argu-
ment was unsuccessful. The court held that because of the overcrowding of detention
facilities within the City of New York, it is not a violation of the Morrissey "at or
reasonably near" standard to detain parolees and conduct preliminary hearings at
Ossining, some thirty-five miles away from New York City. 33 N.Y.2d at 34-35, 300
N.E.2d at 720-21, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
11. Hereinafter cited as instant case.
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Throughout Anglo-American legal history a concern for the pro-
cedural rights of the individual accused of a crime has gradually de-
veloped.1 However, it is only in the last few years that the judiciary
has begun to examine the question of what constitutes the rights of
those convicted and sentenced.1 Consequently, parole revocation due
process requirements, until recently, were in a state of protean evolu-
tion, subjecting parolees to jurisdictional discrepancies.14 These dis-
crepancies corresponded to the variations in theories of parole adopted
by each court.15 The philosophical debate centered around a right-
privilege distinction.'" Some jurisdictions held that parole revocation
was analogous to the prosecutorial deprivation of liberty protected
by the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments,17 while others treated
parole revocation as an administrative proceeding with very limited
procedural rights.'8 This latter "privilege" theory followed from the
assumption that the parolee has no liberty of which he is deprived
during the period between his release on parole and the date his
sentence is set to expire.' 9
New York was one of the states which provided due process rights
for parolees20 prior to the Supreme Court's recent decisions2' on the
12. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 578-91 (2d
ed. 1898); See e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
14. Before Gagnon, some jurisdictions held that a parolee had no right to counsel
at a parole revocation hearing. See, e.g., Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th
Cir. 1969); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d
225 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 453 P.2d 35, cert. denied, 396
U.S. 904 (1969); Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 419 P.2d 253 (1966); State ex tel.
London v. Parole & Pardon Comm'n, 2 Ohio St. 2d 224, 208 N.E.2d 137 (1965);
Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 (1969). Other courts held the contrary
view. That is, that the right to the assistance of counsel at such hearing was con-
stitutionally mandated. See, e.g., Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439
(1957); People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
15. See, Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. Rnv. 344-46 (1971).
16. Id. at 289-300.
17. Id. at 344 n.405.
18. Id. at 344 n.406.
19. Id. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L. REV. 1439, 1451 (1968).
20. N.Y. Coaaac. LAw § 212(7) (McKinney 1970) gives the alleged parole vio-
lator an opportunity to be heard. People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376,
267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971) guaranteed a right to counsel at such hearing.
21. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972).
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subject. Before January 1971,22 New York parolees were statutorily
granted the right to a hearing before a three member board so that
the charges against them might be explained.23 The statute, although
allowing the parolee to appear personally, expressly forbade the ap-
pearance of counsel. The New York Court of Appeals in People ex.
rel. Menechino v. Warden24 held that this statute vested the parole
board "with unfettered discretion" 25 in deciding whether or not a
parole violation had occurred and if one had, whether or not the pa-
rolee should be returned to prison. The United States Supreme Court
had not as of the date of the Menechino decision had occasion to con-
sider whether a right to counsel exists at parole revocation hearings.
Therefore, reasoning by analogy from prior Supreme Court decisions
requiring that counsel be afforded a probationer at a proceeding to
revoke probation and impose sentence, 26 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that a parolee had a corresponding right under the New
York State and federal constitutions,21 since both procedures might
result in a deprivation of liberty.28
Subsequent to Menechino, the United States Supreme Court in
Morrissey v. Brewer29 provided, as one of the guidelines for due process
in parole revocation proceedings, the right to a preliminary hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable grounds to
believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts which could con-
stitute a violation of parole.30 Prior to Morrissey, such right to a pre-
liminary hearing was mandated neither by statute nor case law in
New York. More recently, the Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,8'
defined the limits of the federal constitutional right to counsel at the
preliminary and final revocation hearings. The question then be-
came: What will be the effect of these recent United States Supreme
Court decisions on the New York law regarding the right to counsel in
the parole revocation process? The answer can be found in People
ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner.
22. This was the date of Menechino.
23. N.Y. Coaac. LAw § 212(7) (McKinney 1970).
24. 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
25. Id. at 380, 267 N.E.2d at 240, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
26. McConneU v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
27. 27 N.Y.2d at 382, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
28. Id., 267 N.E.2d at 241, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
29. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
30. Id. at 485.
31. 93 S.Ot. 1756 (1973).
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At the core of the ratio decidendi of the instant case was the court
of appeals' attempt to reconcile Menechino with Gagnon, since the
two were partially at variance. The Menechino court, attempting to
predict the Supreme Court's reaction, had held that all parolees had
an absolute federal and state right to counsel.32 In Gagnon, however,
the Supreme Court had found no such absolute right, and left the
issue to be settled on a case-by-case basis.P3 Consequently, the Calloway
majority34 set out to correct Menechino's faulty conjecture. Not wishing
to overrule the earlier decision outright, the majority instead emascu-
lated it by finding that parolees had an absolute state constitutional
right to counsel at the final hearing,3 5 but lacked a corresponding
right at the preliminary adjudication.m3 Thus, the question remaining
to be decided in the instant case was narrowed to whether the state
constitution required the assistance of counsel at the preliminary pa-
role revocation hearing.
To answer this question the court reasoned in the following
manner: Revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution,
and thus, not all of the rights due a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing apply to parole revocations. The preliminary hearing is intended
to be informal and summary in nature, with only a "minimal inquiry"
necessary to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable
grounds to believe that the parolee has committed acts that would con-
stitute a violation of parole. Since the preliminary hearing does not
require a final resolution of the charges on factual issues, it is doubtful
that the presence of counsel would be of any constructive assistance
to the parolee. Therefore, in the vast number of cases, the Tight to
counsel at a preliminary parole revocation hearing is not required
by due process under the New York State constitution since the pre-
liminary revocation hearing is not critical to the fairness of the final
32. 27 N.Y.2d at 380, 267 N.E.2d at 240, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
33. 93 S.Ot. 1756, 1763 (1973).
34. The dissenting opinion, however, saw no need to reconcile Gagnon and Mene-
chino at the state level. Rather it called for a state right to counsel at the preliminary
as well as at the final hearing, despite, the fact that there may not be a corresponding
federal right. The state right should be based upon the rationales underlying Menechino
rather than Gagnon. Instant case at 35, 300 N.E.2d at 721, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (Fuld,
C.J., dissenting). This majority-minority difference of opinion becomes clearer when
note is taken of the fact that the judge who authored the Galloway dissent also wrote
the Menechino majority opinion, while the spokesman for the majority in Galloway dis-
sented in Menechino.
35. Instant case at 30, 300 N.E.2d at 718, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
36. Id. at 31-32, 300 N.E.2d at 719, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 181-82.
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hearing. However, the court also concluded that the assistance of
counsel at the preliminary hearing might in some cases be necessary
to satisfy the requirements of due process. Therefore, the court held
that the parole board must determine, on a case-by-case basis, in ac-
cordance with Gagnon, which situations require the assistance of
counsel for fundamental fairness.
To reach this result, the majority applied only the black letter
rules of Menechino, Morrissey and Gagnon, while disregarding or
distorting the reasons behind the decisions. This methodology was the
most glaring defect of the court's opinion, for it culminated in a ne-
gation of the spirit of cases which were meant to be an expansion rather
than a diminution of parolee rights.
The reason for the Menechino holding was that parole revoca-
tion results in the deprivation of liberty.37 When there is the possibil-
ity of such deprivation, the fourteenth amendment mandates the aid
of counsel to insure an effective presentation of the parolee's case.
The parole board would thus be prevented from basing its determina-
tion on a mistaken view of the facts due to the parolee's inability to
adequately represent himself.38
Morrissey, like Menechino, begins its reasoning process with a
recognition that parole revocation involves a deprivation of liberty.8D
Citing Menechino,40 the Supreme Court recognized that society, as
well as the individual parolee, has an interest in not having parole
revoked because of erroneous information or because of a mistaken
evaluation of the need to revoke parole.41 For the sake of accuracy
in a procedure with such serious consequences, due process mandates 42
that two hearings be held.43 The first hearing is to be a factual de-
termination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the
parolee committed the violation, 44 while the second hearing is an
evaluation of any contested evidence and a consideration of whether
the facts as determined warrant revocation. 4
37. 27 N.Y.2d at 381-82, 267 N.E.2d at 241, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
38. Id.
39. 408 U.S. at 479-82.
40. Id. at 484.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 484-88.
44. Id. at 471.
45. Id. at 487-88.
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The Supreme Court in Gagnon,46 made no distinction between
the preliminary and final revocation hearing when it decided the ques-
tion of whether a parolee has a federal due process right to be repre-
sented by retained or appointed counsel at the Morrissey hearings.
Instead, it reaffirmed the reasons for the two hearings as stated in
Morrissey.47 The Court then held that the presence of counsel, al-
though not constitutionally mandated in all cases, is required if the
unskilled parolee has difficulty in presenting his version of the dis-
puted facts or where the presentation of evidence requires the exam-
ination or cross-examination of witnesses or when complex docu-
mentary evidence must be offered or dissected.48 The reason that
Gagnon did not mandate counsel in all cases was that in most cases
there is no factual dispute; 49 rather, in the routine case, the parolee
has been convicted of another crime or has admitted the charges
against him. 0
The Galloway court, however, by ignoring the reasons for the
Gagnon rule, distorted the decision by placing an erroneous empha-
sis on what it calls a "discretionary" right,51 with the discretion to be
exercised by the parole board.52 If the majority were as concerned
with accurate information as were the courts in the cases relied on,
it would have had to establish a state right to counsel, not only at
the primarily evaluative final hearing but also at the preliminary
hearing, the major purpose of which is fact-finding. Instead, the
majority makes a theoretical distinction between the two hearings;
a distinction made neither in Morrissey nor Gagnon. The distinction
was premised on the theory that the preliminary hearing is "not criti-
cal ' 53 to fairness at the final hearing where the right to counsel is
guaranteed. The observation that, in practice, most of the fact-finding
is done at the preliminary hearing, demonstrates the unsoundness of
the court's premise.5 4 Furthermore, the conclusion that the prelim-
46. 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973).
47. Id. at 1761.
48. Id. at 1762.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Instant case at 30, 300 N.E.2d at 718, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
52. Id. at 32, 300 N.E.2d at 719, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
53.,,d. at 31, 300 N.E.2d at 719, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
54. : Interview with Herman Schwartz, Professor of Law, and other attorneys who
have hahdled parole revocation hearings in New York State, in Buffalo, New York,
Sept: 29, 1973.
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inary hearing is not a "critical stage" overlooks many significant
questions. If no official record is kept of the proceeding because it is
an "informal" 5 administrative hearing, "summary in nature, '" how
will a lawyer be able to prepare the case for the final hearing after
being excluded from the first? If "the parolee is arrested at a place
distant from the state institution, to which he may be returned before
the final decision is made concerning revocation,"r how will the at-
torney, retained or appointed at the place of the reincarceration, be
able effectively to gather proof or find witnesses, especially poor and
inarticulate witnesses who might find it difficult to answer written
interrogatories?
It is clear from the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey that
parole officers are permitted to employ the conventional substitutes
for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and documentary
evidence.58 In fact, the parole officers, employed and domiciled at the
place of arrest rather than at the place of reincarceration, will most
likely elect to use such substitutes rather than to travel in order to
appear. In such a case, how will the attorney, having no opportunity
to cross examine the parole officer at the time of the preliminary
hearing, ever regain at the final hearing, such an important tool for
ascertaining truth? This question is particularly significant because
the parole officer's testimony, based primarily on hearsay, is often
the most substantial part of the evidence against the parolee, and is
unlikely to be overturned.59 Given these problems, the argument can
certainly be made that the preliminary hearing is indeed a "critical
stage."
Another weakness of the decision is its lack of specificity and
concrete hypotheticals to illustrate to lower courts and to parolees
the conditions which would mandate such "discretionary" right to
counsel.60 The standard established is vague and uncertain, and
merely restates the broad Gagnon guidelines
55. Instant case at 31, 300 N.E.2d at 719, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
56. Id.
57. 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
58. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760 n.5 (1973).
59. See note 54 supra.
60. The primary responsibility for this weakness of course lies with Gagnon, whose
guidelines were merely adopted by Calloway. Another reason, however, is that the in-
stant case did not consider the facts of the four lower court cases. This occurred because
relators Calloway and Robinson were no longer restrained from their liberty as of the
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that counsel should be provided in cases where ... the probationer
or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim
(1) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions
upon which he is at liberty; or (2) that, even if the violation is a
matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons
which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation in-
appropriate and that the reasons are complex and otherwise diffi-
cult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment
of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider especially in
doubtful cases, whether the [parolee] appears to be capable of speak-
ing effectively for himself. 1
How is a parolee to know what would constitute a mitigating
circumstance? How is he to know whether his situation is complex
enough to require a request for a lawyer? The meaning of "capable of
speaking effectively for himself" is not at all clear. Moreover, the ma-
jority neglected to point out that Gagnon required that the parolee
be informed of his right to counsel.6 2 Upon notifying the parolee of
his rights, the parole boards should have also been required to ex-
plain to the parolee the guidelines which, if met, would constitu-
tionally mandate the right to counsel in his particular case. Further-
more, to require that the parolee be so inarticulate as to be unable to
present his own case, while simultaneously requiring that he be suffi-
ciently intelligent to appropriately request for himself the aid of
counsel is to establish a contradiction which could effectively pre-
clude the right to counsel in all cases. Although this contradiction
is rooted in the Gagnon case-by-case approach, the court's conclu-
sion is contrary to the spirit of the decision it relied on.
The court also considered the question of whether the right to
bail or pre-hearing release exists for a parolee detained in advance of
a revocation hearing. While neither the New York State nor federal
constitution explicitly decrees a right to bail, they both proscribe
time of the decision, petitioner Stephens was afforded the assistance of counsel at his
hearing, and petitioner Richardson was declared delinquent and ordered returned to
custody before the date of the Morrissey decision and was therefore not entitled to a
Morrissey preliminary hearing. The court did not dismiss for mootness, however,
because of the importance of the issues raised and the desirability of prompt resolution.
Instant case at 30 n.1, 32 n.2, 300 N.E.2d at 717 n.1, 719 n.2, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 180
n.1, 183 n.2.
61. Id. at 31-32, 300 N.E.2d at 719, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
62. 93 S.Ct. at 1764.
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"excessive bail. ' 63 From this language, the majority concluded that
the parolee has no constitutional right to bail. 64
The majority can certainly be criticized for its narrow treatment
of this issue. The court should not have summarily dismissed the pos-
sibility of a constitutional right to bail without first considering
whether or not the absence of bail could be interpreted as "excessive
bail" and therefore constitutionally proscribed.65 Moreover, if the ma-
jority had concerned itself with the issue of deprivation of liberty, as
did Menechino, Morrissey and Gagnon, it might have found a due
process right to bail or pre-hearing release by balancing the interests
involved. The parolee's pre-hearing release is a necessary component
of accurate fact-finding, which is clearly an important societal concern.
Since no right to counsel was found, the court should have found a
right to bail or release, in order to facilitate the parolee's ability to
compile evidence in order to insure that his right to be heard will
be effective. Moreover, society has a stake in whatever chance there may
be of restoring the parolee to normal and useful life. Certainly in-
carcerating the parolee before he is found to have committed a viola-
tion will not enhance his chances of rehabilitation. Rather, it will de-
crease that possibility by arbitrarily tearing the parolee from the family
and vocational life he should be attempting to rebuild. Unless the
parolee is suspected of a serious crime, the repetition of which would
endanger society, the state clearly has no interest in an action which
will do such violent damage to the rehabilitative process. This would
be especially true if at the final hearing it were ultimately determined
that the evidence did not establish sufficient grounds to reincarcerate
him.
Furthermore, the court's contention that the granting of bail or
release by a court not in control of the proceedings would create such
"insuperable" 66 problems for the parole board that parole could not be
63. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
64. Instant case at 33, 300 N.E.2d at 719, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 184. The court con-
cluded from this lack of constitutional right to bail that the right to bail is purely
statutory, and that the statutory right exists only in criminal proceedings. This excluded
a statutory right to bail for parolees, since the parole revocation process is not a criminal
proceeding. Id. at 34, 300 N.E.2d at 720, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
65. This is one of at least three interpretations of the meaning of the excessive bail
clause. Since the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, the New
York Court of Appeals could have adopted such an interpretation. For a full discussion
of this constitutional question, see Foote, Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 959, 969-71
(1965).
66. Instant case at 34, 300 N.E.2d at 720, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
272
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granted is unconvincing. This analysis overlooks the fact that the con-
cept of bail was developed in order to assure the appearance of the ac-
cused by means less drastic than incarceration. 67 Thus, if the alleged
violation is not serious, there is no rational basis for detaining the
accused parole violator if the parole board can use alternative means
to insure eventual appearance at the hearing. For example, the parole
board does have sufficient control over the parolee to require him
to report by phone or in person every day. Certainly this would be an
adequate alternative means of control and would cause no "insupera-
ble" problem, particularly for a technical violation. Moreover, even
when the alleged violation is a serious one, such as arrest on suspicion
of committing a new crime, there is no reason for the parole board to
detain the parolee without bail. In such a case the police may arrest and
the court would decide whether the individual was a good or bad bail
risk. If a court decides that the parolee is a good risk, the parole board
should not be permitted to independently supersede its determination.6 8
In spite of the fact that Morrissey attempted to extend due process
rights to parolees, some commentators on the impact of this case were
reluctant to count it among the landmark decisions of immediate
operational significance.69 This reluctance resulted from the Supreme
Court's failure to mandate either right to counsel or a right to bail
or pre-hearing release.70 The failure of the New York Court of Ap-
peals to extend the right to counsel under the New York State con-
stitution to the preliminary hearing, except on a case-by-case basis,
while simultaneously maintaining that no right to bail exists, will do
little to remedy the Morrissey defects. Instead, the impact of the in-
stant case will be to reinforce the Morrissey weaknesses. The spurious
distinction between the preliminary and final hearings will, in prac-
tice, lead to a serious undermining of the procedural rights developed
by Menechino.
Perhaps in theory the preliminary hearing is a mere "informal
minimal inquiry," insignificant when compared with the final hearing
at which the parolee's fate "hangs in the balance"; 71 in fact the pre-
67. See 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAIrLAND, supra note 12, at 589-90.
68. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 497 n.8 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting opinion).
69. See, e.g., Cohn, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process and Parole
Revocation, 8 CRim. L. BULL. 616 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 IAv.
L. Rav. 1, 95-102 (1972).
70. Cohn, supra note 69, at 620-21.
71. Instant case at 31, 300 N.E.2d at 718, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 181-82.
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liminary hearing is the only hearing.7 2 This result obtains because
the preliminary hearing is indeed a "critical stage," as recognized by
the Supreme Court in dealing with criminal prosecutions. 73 Although
parole revocation is not a part of the criminal process,' 4 both the logic
and the policies underlying the Supreme Court's decisions in the
criminal area provide useful guidelines for determining what would
constitute a "critical stage." Such stage exists when: rights must be
asserted or the opportunity lost;75 the result may affect the whole
trial;76 the skilled interrogation of witnesses requires the experience
of a lawyer; 77 and trained counsel can more effectively discover the
case against his client and thus prepare a proper defense.78 Since these
identical contingencies could arise at the preliminary parole reovca-
tion hearing, there is no justification for the drastic difference in
treatment. Until that fact is recognized by the judiciary, the courts
will be filled with appellants so arguing.
Thus, when the majority decided to adopt Gagnon's case-by-case
approach as New York law, rather than to extend Menechino to the
preliminary hearing as a state right, it guaranteed more litigation.
The guidelines will encourage the majority of parolees to request
counsel based on claims of difficulty in presenting their version of the
disputed facts. However, placing the decision of which requests should
be granted in the hands of the parole board will mean that most will
be denied since parole boards have fought steadily against the inter-
vention of counsel in the parole revocation process.7 9 Therefore, it
will be the judiciary which will ultimately be forced to decide which
new cases mandate the assistance of counsel.
If guidance can be gained from an examination of the develop-
ment of the right to counsel in the criminal process, the continuing
source of controversy and litigation caused by a case-by-case approach"
72. See note 54 supra.
73. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1969); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59, 60 (1963).
74. Instant case at 30, 300 N.E.2d at 718, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 181; see Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
75. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52, 53 (1961).
76. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
77. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1969).
78. Id.
79. See note 54 supra.
80. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338 (1962) for discussion
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will again be abandoned in favor of an absolute right."' Until this
occurs, however, the impact on individual parolees will be disastrous.
The decision not to require counsel at the preliminary hearing will
result in more findings of probable cause. This, coupled with the pa-
rolee's inability to be released on bail or on his own recognizance in
order to gather evidence on his own behalf, will result in more revo-
cations. More revocations will in turn mean more reincarcerations
which will result in a disruption of the rehabilitative process. This
will occur because the parolee will be torn from his family and job
and suffer damage to his already marred reputation. Thus, he will
have difficulty in establishing in his employer, the community at
large, and perhaps in himself as well, a confidence in his eventual re-
habilitation. Moreover, the instant decision will increase the parole
board's discretion, thereby increasing the parolee's perception that
someone can deprive him of his liberty arbitrarily. Such a perception
might very well do permanent damage to the parolee's chances for a
rehabilitated belief in due process of law to the detriment of the
very correctional process for which the parole system was designed.
PEGGY RABKIN
CRIMINAL LAW-NEW YORK ADOPTS THE INEVITABLE Dis-
COVERY EXCEPTION-UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY OF WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
AND SEARCHES-STRIKES DOWN DEATH PENALTY STATUTE.
On the night of September 8, 1969, at approximately 9 p.m., peti-
tioner robbed a service station attendant in Canastota, New York,
fleeing with the attendant's wallet and the station's cash receipts in an
automobile belonging to a friend. A few minutes after the holdup,
two policemen identified the automobile and proceeded to stop and
question the petitioner. Suddenly, he produced a revolver and fa-
tally shot both police officers. Before losing consciousness, however, one
of the officers transmitted the petitioner's last name and the car's
license number to headquarters. Meanwhile, petitioner abandoned
his friend's car and forced a woman to drive him in her own auto-
of the Bettes v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) case-by-case approach as a continuing
source of litigation in both state and federal courts.
81. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
